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Abstract 
 
 
This paper discusses whether a new paradigm is necessary for independent economic 
regulation of electricity (and closely associated natural gas) systems. We begin by 
summarising the nature of the traditional model of electricity reform and the place of 
economic regulation within it. Next we outline the drivers for changing the current model 
of electricity regulation, namely, the maturity of the existing model, the reality of 
changing circumstances, and the coming of age of climate change concern. We go on to 
discuss the premises on which a new model of regulation should be based. These are: 
remembering the successes of the current system of regulation; a new focus on processes 
not just outcomes; a recognition of the economics of climate change; and the appropriate 
management of uncertainty. We then highlight the key elements of a new model for 
regulation: new processes of regulation; new models of competition and the issues raised 
by a focus on climate change.The paper draws heavily on the experience of the UK, but 
has direct implications for the rest of the European Union countries and for other 
countries whose regulatory systems mirror them. 
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Electricity markets in the developed world stand at something of a crossroads. Many 
countries have made some, often substantial, progress with market-based reforms in 
production and retailing and the introduction of incentive regulation of networks. During 
the reform period governments have sought to reduce their direct involvement in the 
electricity sector. Now however rising environmental concern about global warming is 
beginning to focus minds more clearly on the need for the reduction of carbon dioxide 
emissions from the electricity sector. The need for substantial decarbonisation of the 
electricity sector is increasingly recognised and being reflected in economic policy 
around the world, and particularily with EU countries.2
 
There has been significant agreement on what constitutes the elements of an electricity 
reform package (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005a). Addressing climate change seriously, 
however, has the potential for introducing significant divergence in policy choices 
between countries. This paper will argue that electricity (and, by association, natural gas) 
regulation in an era of significant climate change concern3 needs to strengthen the role of 
competition and market forces as well as to respond to the political pressure for action on 
decarbonisation of the electricity and heat sectors. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. First we will discuss the nature of the traditional model of 
electricity reform and the place of economic regulation within it. Next we will outline the 
drivers for changing the current model of electricity regulation. Third, we will discuss the 
premises on which a new model should be based. Fourth, we will outline the key 
elements of a new model. Lastly we will conclude with lessons for independent 
regulatory agencies, governments and companies. The paper draws heavily on the 
experience of the UK, but has direct implications for most other European Union 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on a talk entitled ‘Regulating electricity networks in an age of rising real prices’ given 
at the London EPRG/CEEPR conference in September 2007. Comments from that conference and 
audiences at BERR, SGBI and the University of Cambridge are acknowledged. The author wishes to 
acknowledge the support and encouragement of Ofgem. The views expressed in the paper are entirely those 
of the author and should not be taken to be those of Ofgem. The author also wishes to thank Richard Green, 
Stephen Littlechild, Steve Smith and David Newbery for detailed comments on an earlier draft. 
2 Grubb, Jamasb and Pollitt (2008) provides detailed analyses of how current and future policy can achieve 
this in the context of the UK. 
3 Note climate change concern could be relatively greater than or less than actual climate change. 
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countries who operate within the context of EU energy and environment directives aimed 
at achieving common goals and spreading best practice forms of action and regulation. 
 
1. The Traditional Model of Electricity Reform 
 
The model of electricity reform as it first emerged in Chile (1982), UK (1990) and 
Norway (1991), and subsequently in many other jurisdictions including Australia and 
Texas, had four key elements.  
 
1. The introduction of a competitive wholesale power market. 
2. The gradual extension of competition in the retail market. 
3. The regulation of network services via CPI-X regulation. 
4. The introduction of additional incentives for quality of service and loss reduction. 
 
The reform model was supported by rules on the separation of generation, transmission, 
distribution and retail businesses in order to improve third party access to the monopoly 
networks.  
 
In many jurisdictions reform involved the privatisation and restructuring of state owned 
monopolies (Pollitt, 1997). In some other jurisdictions with initially private monopolies 
legislation and voluntary agreements resulted in divestitures of generation assets in order 
to facilitate competition in the wholesale power market. 
 
Reform was often accompanied by the introduction of an independent regulatory agency, 
with an arms length relationship to government departments and with statutory duties to 
promote competition and to set regulated tariffs4. This new regulatory agency was 
usually a specialist in energy regulation and often combined electricity and gas 
regulation, where gas was available. 
 
To understand the role of such economic regulators it is worth examining the mandate of 
the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority in the UK. This is the governing board of 
Ofgem, THE GB energy regulatory agency (see Box 1)5. 
 
The legislation governing Ofgem has arisen principally from the Gas Act 1986 and the 
Electricity Act 1989 which privatized the state owned industries. The duties of Ofgem 
were modified in the Utilities Act 2000 which introduced, inter alia, the protection of 
vulnerable customers and the Energy Act 2004 which included provisions about such 
things as energy security and having regard to best regulatory practice. In addition 
Ofgem’s duties also arise from general competition legislation, namely the Competition 
Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act 2002, as well as arising from national implementation of 
European Community directives. 
 
                                                 
4 See Larsen et al. (2005) on the duties of a sample of European energy regulators. 
5 The UK consists of Great Britain (GB) and Northern Ireland. Ofgem regulates only the GB market. In the 
paper we use GB where it is important to indicate that what is discussed only refers to GB and not to 
Northern Ireland. 
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Box 1: The Mandate of the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority 
 
The Authority’s principal objective when carrying out certain of its functions under each of the Gas 
Act and the Electricity Act is to protect the interests of consumers, present and future, wherever 
appropriate by promoting effective competition between persons engaged in, or in commercial 
activities connected with, the shipping, transportation or supply of gas conveyed through pipes, and 
the generation, transmission, distribution or supply of electricity or the provision or use of electricity 
interconnectors. 
 
The Authority must when carrying out those functions have regard to: 
• The need to secure that, so far as it is economical to meet them, all reasonable demands in Great 
Britain for gas conveyed through pipes are met; 
• The need to secure that all reasonable demands for electricity are met; 
• The need to secure that licence holders are able to finance the activities which are the subject of 
obligations on them ; and 
• The interests of individuals who are disabled or chronically sick, of pensionable age, with low 
incomes, or residing in rural areas.  
 
Subject to the above, the Authority is required to carry out the functions referred to in the manner 
which it considers is best calculated to: 
 
• Promote efficiency and economy on the part of those licensed  under the relevant Act and the 
efficient use of gas conveyed through pipes and electricity conveyed by distribution systems or 
transmission systems; 
• Protect the public from dangers arising from the conveyance of gas through pipes or the use of gas 
conveyed through pipes and from the generation, transmission, distribution or supply of electricity; 
• Contribute to the achievement of sustainable development; and 
• Secure a diverse and viable long-term energy supply. 
 
In carrying out the functions referred to, the Authority must also have regard, to: 
 
• The effect on the environment of activities connected with the conveyance of gas through pipes or 
with the generation, transmission, distribution or supply of electricity; 
• The principles under which regulatory activities should be transparent, accountable, proportionate, 
consistent and targeted only at cases in which action is needed and any other principles that appear to 
it to represent the best regulatory practice; and 
• Certain statutory guidance on social and environmental matters issued by the Secretary of State. 
 
The Authority has powers under the Competition Act to investigate suspected anti-competitive 
activity and take action for breaches of the prohibitions in the legislation in respect of the gas and 
electricity sectors in Great Britain and is a designated National Competition Authority under the EC 
Modernisation Regulation  and therefore part of the European Competition Network. The Authority 
also has concurrent powers with the Office of Fair Trading in respect of market investigation 
references to the Competition Commission. 
 
(Source: Ofgem’s website) [My italics and bold] 
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Reading the summary in Box 1 suggests that while Ofgem has a principal objective – 
captured in its current strap-line: ‘promoting choice and value for all gas and electricity 
customers’6, several other elements of economic regulation seem largely tacked on to 
Ofgem’s duties. In particular Ofgem’s role in ensuring that climate change objectives for 
the sector are things that it should have regard to rather than objectives. There also a 
loose requirement to have regard to energy security issues. I would want to suggest, that 
at the very least, Ofgem’s mandate with regard to implementing government policy 
towards climate change in the energy sector is rather vague and that Ofgem’s regulatory 
role in the politically sensitive areas of vulnerable customers, energy security and 
decarbonisation of the electricity sector is ill-defined and reflects the incremental addition 
of matters to which it should have regard to. This lack of clarity is reflected in a lack of 
associated powers in these areas. 
 
Taking Ofgem as an example of a leading independent energy regulator, we take the 
traditional model of electricity and gas market regulation in the reform period to centrally 
be aiming at promoting competition and effective monopoly regulation (a perfect 
complement to competition in generation and retail) with additional concerns secondary. 
This is not to say that many other jurisdictions, especially in Europe and many of the 
states of the United States, only ever aspired to fully implement the ‘traditional’ reform 
model (see Pollitt, 2008 for more expansion of this in a global context). 
 
It is important to evaluate the success of the traditional reform model for its own sake but 
also to understand what we have learned about the regulation of electricity markets that 
might be enduring.  
 
I return to the elements of the reform model to offer an assessment of the extent to which 
they have been achieved in GB, as the prelude to a discussion of what the future might 
hold for energy regulation. 
 
 1.1 Competition in wholesale markets. 
 
The evidence on this is generally very positive. Wholesale power markets can and do 
work well with potentially large benefits for consumers. In GB the history of wholesale 
electricity market reform divides into two periods: the initial period up to the late 1990s 
and the more recent period. The first period was characterized by large efficiency 
improvements at existing plants, significant new entry but problems of price coordination 
between incumbents. However robust regulatory action to reduce the market share of 
incumbents in the price setting part of the generation mix successfully resulted in highly 
competitive market. Newbery and Pollitt (1997) found that the privatization and 
restructuring of the CEGB, the former state owned generation and transmission 
monopoly in England and Wales, resulted in significant welfare gains for society, but that 
electricity consumers paid higher prices than would have been the case in the absence of 
privatization (at least until 1996).7 Evans and Green (2003), looked closely at why 
                                                 
6 See www.ofgem.gov.uk, accessed on April 11, 2008. 
7 Sweeting (2007) confirmed that observed pricing behaviour between 1995 and 2000 was consistent with 
the existence of tacit collusion. 
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electricity prices subsequently came down at the beginning of the second period. They 
attempt to distinguish the impact of declining concentration in the power market from the 
introduction of new electricity trading arrangements in 2001, which eliminated the old 
compulsory power pool and introduced bilateral contracting with a balancing market. 
They found that it was the declining concentration, which explains the fall in wholesale 
prices (which was very marked around this period). An important lesson from the UK’s 
experience with addressing the initial problems is that effective regulatory action to 
reduce incumbent market shares is more important than market design per se. The new 
trading arrangements (NETA) were expensive at £1 billion but did however result in a 
much more competitive contract market for power, made gaming in the power market 
more difficult and did remove capacity payments (which created certainty about the 
incentives to withhold plant). Now the GB wholesale power market looks very 
competitive by world standards with 7 major firms competing with one another.8
 
 1.2 Competition in retail markets. 
 
Retail competition has been very popular with large industrial and commercial customers, 
who have benefited from the competition in the wholesale market. This phenomenon is 
observed across the world. Retail competition for household customers has been slower 
to develop due a combination of initial delays in deregulating the household market (in 
GB these were due to a desire for an orderly run down of the domestic coal industry 
which supplied the electricity sector at above market prices), difficulties in obtaining 
third party access and the transaction costs of switching supplier. Littlechild (2000) 
argues strongly for the competitive advantages of full retail competition and there has 
been significant switching in GB, with 47.9% of households having switched from their 
incumbent by March 2007, 8 years after full deregulation. Gross switching rates continue 
to be 1-1.5% per month. It is also the case that the average price saving from switching 
from the incumbent to the cheapest alternative remains around 7%.9 In addition around 
5m customers are on innovative tariffs involving fixed or capped prices or green power, 
which were not offered prior to the introduction of competition. Wilson and Waddams 
(2007) examine the rationality of electricity switchers, showing that a significant minority 
of those who switch have switched to dearer tariffs when they thought they were 
switching to cheaper ones.10 This work however does not fundamentally challenge the 
idea of retail competition so much as to reveal the purchasing mistakes that characterize 
purchases of all goods in a market economy. Indeed a study of financial services in the 
UK revealed an average loss per household of £70-700 p.a. via not purchasing the 
cheapest products (Cook et al., 2002). This is around 1-10 times the upper end of the 
average benefit from switching to the cheapest electricity and gas supplier. However it is 
clearly the case that regulatory efforts to encourage efficient switching and price 
transparency are necessary. 
                                                 
8 Using 2005 figures, Matthes (2007) reports a HHI of less than 1000 for the Great Britain power market, 
indicating a competitive market. In contrast there is an HHI of 1450 in Germany (‘the upper end of a 
moderately conscentrated market’ and over 4000 in the joint France-Belgium-Luxemberg-Netherlands 
market. 
9 See Ofgem (2007a) for details on the state of retail competition in Great Britain. 
10 The study also only focuses on electricity only tariffs not dual fuel tariffs and hence misses joint savings 
for both electricity and gas for dual fuel switchers. This biases the result to an extent that is unclear. 
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 1.3 Regulation of network services via RPI-X 
 
The introduction of incentive regulation of electricity transmission and distribution 
networks has been a notable success story for electricity reform. Following Littlechild’s 
seminal report (1983) the UK introduced a system of price cap regulation for all of its 
privatized natural monopoly industries. This was practically implemented via a regular 
price control review process. Under this process the revenue requirements of the 
regulated companies were assessed via the benchmarking of their existing operating and 
capital costs and the auditing of the their plans for investment going forward. This review 
involved assessing individual efficiency improvement factors for each firm (X) which 
were fixed for the period of the next review relative to the retail prices index (RPI)11. 
This has the effect of providing strong incentives for cost efficiency and transferring 
significant shares of the efficiency gains to consumers. In electricity transmission this 
resulted in prices being reviewed and reset in 1993, 1997, 2001 and 2007 (for five years). 
In electricity distribution reviews have resulted in prices being reset in 1995, 2000 and 
2005 (for five years). Between 1993 and 2005 prices declined by 30% in real terms in 
electricity transmission and by 50% in real terms in electricity distribution. Domah and 
Pollitt (2001) show the substantial gains this system of regulation delivered in electricity 
distribution to 2005, while Newbery and Pollitt (1997) included electricity transmission 
in their positive assessment of the privatization of the CEGB. In comparison to regimes 
where rate of return regulation continued, with limited incentives for cost improvement 
the UK system of monopoly regulation has performed very well (see Hattori et al., 2005 
for a comparison of cost improvement in UK and Japanese electricity distribution over 
the period 1986-2003). 
 
 1. 4 Additional incentives for quality of service and losses 
 
The price control review process aimed at determining regulated prices for electricity 
distribution and transmission has been supplemented by additional incentive schemes to 
cover other performance metrics of interest. Yu et al. (2007) discuss the operation of 
quality of service incentives and energy loss reduction incentives in the UK. Quality of 
service incentives have targeted the number of customer interruptions (CI), average 
customer minutes lost (CML) as well as certain other quality of service metrics such as 
the quality of telephone response to customer queries. These incentives have been 
progressively increased such that companies might receive +/-4% of regulated revenue as 
a result of over/under performance against its individual quality of service standards. 
Strong incentives have also been added to incentivise energy loss reduction within 
distribution networks. As a result average losses across distribution networks in Great 
Britain have fallen from 7.0% to 6.0% between 2000/01 and 2003/04 (though a 
significant portion of this may be due to better measurement). Across the world, such 
incentive payments are generally not incorporated directly into assessments of the 
relative efficiency of distribution networks, which form the basis of the calculation of 
                                                 
11 See Jamasb and Pollitt (2007) for details of how the system has operated in electricity distribution. In the 
UK the retail prices index (RPI) was used, in other countries (e.g. the Netherlands) the formula was CPI-X, 
signifying the use of the closely related consumer price index (CPI). 
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individual X factors. Some jurisdictions, notably Norway, have tried to include the value 
of customer interruptions in the assessment of allowed regulated revenue for distribution 
companies. A clear conclusion is that such targeted incentives can, if large enough, 
motivate significant improvements in performance. However it is unclear whether the 
collection of separately determined individual incentive payments is optimal in aggregate 
(see Yu et al., 2007, for evidence that this is a problem in the UK). Such a piecemeal 
approach extends into the area of regulatory incentives to connect distributed generation 
or private wire networks placed on distribution companies. 
 
2. Drivers of change 
 
I identify three drivers of change for energy regulation in the UK (and hence other 
deregulated energy markets): the maturity of the existing (traditional) model; the reality 
of changing circumstances; and finally the coming of age of climate change concern.12
 
 2.1 The maturity of the existing model 
 
Ofgem’s mandate is to achieve its principal objective by promoting effective 
competition. It is legitimate to ask how would we know if we had established ‘effective 
competition’? And if we had achieved it what are the implications for the existing model 
of regulation?  
 
Independent sectoral regulatory agencies exist for a purpose. Usually that purpose is 
related to the idea that the markets they are regulating need special attention that cannot 
be provided by the general competition authorities, such as the Office of Fair Trading or 
the Competition Commission in the UK. This special attention is due to the immaturity of 
the markets being regulated and hence their need for considerable ongoing monitoring 
and/or the complexity of the assessment of whether the market is competitive and hence 
the need for specialist staff best organized into a separate regulatory agency.  
 
In terms of its principal objective we have already seen that Ofgem (and its predecessor 
Offer) has witnessed notable success. The wholesale market was substantially 
competitive by 2001 when the market shares of the leading companies had been reduced 
by divestiture. Incentive regulation and tough reallocation of costs between distribution 
and retail had ensured that there was a level playing field in retail competition between 
incumbent retailers and new entrants, such that the residential switching rates in GB are 
among the highest in the world (see Littlechild, 2006). 
 
In terms of promoting the efficiency of network companies, real prices fell in all the price 
review periods up to 2005. There was also significant convergence in costs observed 
between electricity distribution companies. 
 
                                                 
12 Helm (2005) in his review of UK energy policy suggests the need to replace existing generating capacity, 
the low carbon economy and the volatility of world energy commodity markets as giving rise to the need 
for a ‘new’ energy policy. 
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We suggest that scope for Ofgem’s efforts to impact prices by promoting competition and 
incentivising efficiency in electricity (and gas) supply further is now limited by the 
achievement of de-concentration in generation asset ownership and significant price 
convergence between suppliers and by the elimination of initially high levels of 
inefficiency in network companies. This is not to say that incumbents have not got 
considerable scope to lose more market share in the household sector but that this trend is 
now well established (3% per year since 2002).  
 
There may also be specific issues associated with gas distribution in the UK, where the 
recent breakup and sale of National Grid’s former monopoly seems to be resulting in 
significant efficiency improvements.13 This suggests that gas distribution’s former 
structure was inefficient and that introducing comparative competition between regional 
monopolies, as was already the case in electricity, will yield significant improvements. It 
remains to be seen how long these efficiency gains will take to be realized, especially 
within National Grid’s remaining four gas distribution areas, now that the scope for 
efficiency savings has been revealed by the new operators of the divested regions. 
 
2.2 The Reality of Changing Circumstances 
 
If the traditional model has had significant success in achieving its mandate, it is also the 
case that the environment in which it is being practiced is changing.  
 
The most visible sign of this is seen in the outcomes of the most recent price control 
reviews that Ofgem has carried out. Three of the four most recent reviews have resulted 
in significant projected rises in capital expenditure compared with the previous price 
control review period. While rising capital investment is not new its impact in driving 
prices up overall is new. 
                                                 
13 National Grid gas distribution was reorganised into 8 regions. 4 of these were sold off in 2005, two to a 
consortium led by Scottish and Southern Energy, one to a consortium including United Utilities and one to 
a consortium led by Macquarie Bank. 
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Table 1: Rising Investment Requirements in Recent Price Reviews 
 
 
  Latest Price 
Control 
Review Period
Dates 
 
(+ implies 
P0 
price 
increase) 
RPI-X formula
after first year 
of price 
control 
 Increase in 
investment 
over previous 
 
price review 
Electricity 
Distribution 
2005-10 +1.3% RPI-0 +48% 
Electricity 
Transmission 
2007-12 +4% RPI+2 +125% 
Gas 
Transmission 
2007-12 +17% RPI-0 -7%* 
Gas 
Distribution 
2008-13 +3.5% RPI+1.1% +30% 
 
*This fall is relative to a rapid rise in gas distribution investment towards the end of the previous five 
years. 
 
The P0 adjustments indicate a rise in price in the first year of all of the above price 
control periods. The RPI-X formulae give the price adjustments in each of the subsequent 
four years of the five-year price control period. In electricity distribution and 
transmission higher real prices have occurred because operating efficiency savings 
(which continue but at a slower rate than previously) are not sufficient to offset the 
effects of the extra capital expenditure on overall revenue requirements.14 This situation 
reflects the fact that the ability for ‘asset sweating’ is much reduced relative to the early 
post-reform years. There are significant methodological issues with the ability of 
efficiency analysis to detect significant operating cost and capital cost inefficiencies 
when the underlying differences in inefficiencies between the firms are small. Doubtless 
improvements in the size of the datasets used for efficiency analysis, via the inclusion of 
international and panel data would help, but would not necessarily address the issue of 
the declining economic significance of measured efficiency differences and the 
unreliability of the methods applied to them (see Pollitt, 2005). 
 
In terms of electricity distribution and transmission a significant part of the increase in 
capital expenditure is driven by low carbon investment, much of it not incentivised under 
the renewables support scheme (Renewables Obligations Certificates or ROCs) or the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme. For electricity distribution this amounts to £500m 
over the price control period (or around 25% of the increase) and for electricity 
                                                 
14 For reference in GB, around 28% of the final price for electricity is for network services and 72% for 
generation and retailing costs (excluding taxes); in gas the network charges make up less than 20% of the 
final price of gas. 
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transmission there has been a separate allowance for £500m for renewable generation 
support in Scotland (under the Transmission Investment for Renewable Generation 
(TIRG) scheme) and scope for more if more renewable generation is connected. 
 
If we assume that extra climate change inspired investment in GB is £200m per annum, 
by 2012 the price of distribution and transmission services might be 5% higher as a result 
of this extra expenditure. 
 
More important in volume terms is the amount of investment required to renew and 
upgrade the existing network. Electricity transmission and distribution investment peaked 
in real terms in the late 1960s, this means rising and expensive replacement investment in 
the current price control period and this trend seems set to continue. Ensuring efficient re-
investment in electricity networks is therefore much more of a priority than it was in the 
early years following the initial reforms because capital expenditure is a more significant 
share of total expenditure on networks than it was in the past (see Pollitt, 2005). 
 
Rising commodity prices for gas and coal have contributed to substantial price rises for 
wholesale power since 2003 in GB. While our analysis of the trend in network services 
costs suggests these are going to rise in real terms, we have already seen substantial rises 
in wholesale power costs and in customer bills. Between March 2003 and September 
2006, when prices peaked, the average household electricity and gas bill rose by £370 to 
£881. This contrasts with consistent falls in electricity and gas bills from 1995 to 2003. 
Such a large rise in the annual fuel bill has raised political questions and led to a 
significant increase in fuel poverty, defined as households which spend more than 10% of 
their income on fuel (primarily gas, but also electricity) to maintain a satisfactory heating 
level. From a low of 1.2 million the number of households defined as fuel poor rose to 
1.5 million in 2005 (7% of all households) as energy prices rose (BERR, 2007a, p.10). 
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Figure 1: 
 
 
Source: BERR (2007a, p.9) 
 
While recent rises in electricity and gas bills are driven by supply and demand in fossil 
fuel commodity markets, the impact of environmental factors on the final price of 
electricity is increasing. 
 
In 2006 around 6% of the price of electricity was related to supporting renewable low 
carbon generation (in spite of this only being 3.4% of electricity production in the UK, 
excluding hydro). This seems set to rise substantially. In addition the final price is 
influenced by the price of permits for CO2 in the EU Emissions Trading System. 
 
2.3 The Coming of Age of Climate Change Concern 
 
So far the impact of climate change policies on electricity prices and the operation of 
electricity markets has been modest in the UK. Even by 2012 - the end of the current 
trading period of the European Emissions Trading System - the likely impact on 
electricity prices in the UK will be 10-15% on the basis of a continuation of existing 
policies.15 The impact on the operation of the wholesale power market is also likely to be 
modest: all new large power stations will be CCGT with no nuclear, clean coal or carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) enabled plants likely to be on line by then. Wind generation is 
currently being built at a modest rate. Even though the requirements under the 
                                                 
15 The share of renewables in total electricity supply is unlikely to be more than 6% at current trends. If this 
is assumed be at a cost of double the average cost of non-renewable generation (and current large hydro 
ignored – slightly over 1% of generation), this adds say 5% to the price. An EU ETS price of 20 euros per 
tonne of CO2, leads to around a 10% rise in electricity prices in the UK above baseline (see Carbon Trust, 
2004). 
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Renewables Obligation Certificate (ROC) Scheme are that around 12% of electricity be 
produced from renewables by 2012, it seems very unlikely that this target can be met. In 
2007 less wind capacity was added in the UK than in 2006 and this figure was less than 
1% of total installed capacity on the system.16
 
However climate change concern is increasing. The influential Stern Review, published 
in 2006, has contributed to a strengthening of government policy and government 
attitudes in the UK. The Stern Review carefully discussed the value of doing something 
about climate change and reached the clear conclusion that significant expenditure of the 
order of 1% of GDP was justified by the economic value of avoiding the risk of 
significant climate change. This expenditure should be spent to achieve a CO2 emissions 
reduction of at least 60% on 1990 levels by 2050. 1% of GDP in the case of the UK is of 
the order £13bn in 2007. The electricity sector is capable of reducing its emissions by 
80% by 2050 (Elders et al., 2006). Assuming other sectors collectively were to keep their 
emissions constant at no extra cost (which would be a good baseline performance) an 
80% de-carbonisation of the electricity sector would reduce total emissions by 20% by 
2050. This suggests that extra expenditure in the electricity supply industry of say £4bn 
p.a. (i.e. one third of the total extra expenditure) might be justified to meet climate 
change emissions reduction targets by 2050. Currently the actual amount of expenditure 
might be of the order of £1bn17 (extra spending on renewables and networks), thus giving 
room for a significant increase.18
 
The Stern review has informed the Climate Change Bill (2007) which establishes the 
Office of Climate Change. This Office is charged with setting 5-year greenhouse gas 
emissions targets for the UK (-20% by 2020 and –60% by 2050) and ensuring that these 
are achieved. A raft of policies have been announced: including the phasing out of 
filament light bulbs by 2011, the requirement for all new homes to be zero emission by 
2016 and the tendering process for a large scale demonstration CCS power plant and the 
commencement of a design approval process for a new generation of nuclear power 
plants. In addition the government is looking at a proposal to create a tidal barrage across 
the Severn Estuary, which would generate 5% of total electricity demand.19 Meanwhile 
the European Union has announced a 20% reduction in CO2 and a target of 20% of all 
energy coming from renewable sources (this could be 35% for electricity), though the 
                                                 
16 See Ofgem (2007b). 
17 This figure should include the extra expenditure on supporting renewables (currently around £500m), 
research and development (less than £100m) and on networks (say £100m) induced by climate change. The 
price impact of the EUETS represents a transfer from consumers to producers to reflect the carbon 
externality should not to be included, though the fuel switching that it induces does impose real costs (say 
£200m) but these are a relatively small fraction of the headline impact (which might be of the order of 
£2bn). 
18 Imagining how to spend this insurance money is quite easy. Elders et al. (2006) suggest that wind 
capacity alone in GB could be 60 GW by 2050 and generate up to 50% of our electricity. At a subsidy rate 
of £1500 per kW, this requires expenditure of £90 bn, which is £3bn over 30 years! Of course we might 
expect the required subsidy rate to fall due to learning and the economy to grow raising the available 
subsidy (which is a constant percentage of GDP). 
19 See BERR (2007b). 
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targets vary across countries.20 The second trading period of the EU ETS began on 1 
January 2008 with much lower quotas than in the first period and significantly higher 
prices for CO2 permits. At the municipal level, some local authorities have announced 
their own CO2 reduction targets. In some cases these have been more ambitious than 
national targets. For instance the Mayor of London has announced a commitment to 60% 
reduction in CO2 from London by 2025.21
 
The cumulative impact of these policies on the electricity market looks likely to be 
significant. There is likely to be pressure to build significantly more renewable 
generation capacity than in the past and for this to run on the system to save CO2. The 
impact of this on the operation of the wholesale market is potentially very significant. 
Large amounts of high fixed capital cost – low running cost plant creates price volatility 
in the balancing market and exposes un-hedged players to significant risks. This is in 
contrast to the benign effect of the entry of combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants 
into the wholesale power market in the 1990s. CCGTs could be built quickly in response 
to market conditions, they were straightforward to finance and could be invested in on a 
merchant basis. One could argue that it was CCGT technology, which facilitated the 
emergence of a competitive market in the 1990s. Systems where hydro power was the 
price setting plant often had to accommodate wholesale price volatility (which they did in 
Norway and in New Zealand) or to employ a system of cost-based bidding in the power 
pool which they did in Chile. However such instability in hydro systems is seasonal 
rather than intra-day. It is possible that a deregulated market can accommodate the 
volatility introduced by renewables into pricing but it will require much more flexibility 
in demand side management (such as residential smart metering to control domestic 
loads). 
 
The new low carbon electricity market envisaged by policy makers is still some way off. 
In the UK 9.2 GW of Wind Capacity (more than 3 times the current installed capacity) is 
in the planning process, awaiting approval from local planning authorities.22 Such wind 
capacity will also require significant upgrading of the national transmission grid (which 
also requires local planning permission). Approval of the design of new nuclear power 
plants is only the start of the process of actually building a new nuclear power plant. It 
seems unlikely that a new plant will open for 10 years (5 years for approval, followed by 
5 years to build). Carbon Capture and Storage is progressing with a demonstration plant 
competition underway in the UK and may yet prove to be highly significant, especially as 
a medium term solution.23 However its true costs (particularly per tonne of CO2 actually 
captured) remain to be established in a real power station and its public acceptability (as a 
technological fix) is largely unknown, due to ignorance of how it works (see Reiner, 
2008). Much is made of the scope for demand side reductions in energy use, with low 
                                                 
20 See EU Commission (2008, p.41), which sets a draft target of 15% of final energy consumption in the 
UK coming from renewable sources. As electricity is less than 20% of final energy consumption, even if 
other sectors managed to achieve a highly ambitious 10% renewables target, electricity would be required 
to acheive around a 35% renewable share to meet the overall target (see DUKES Table 1.1.5). If biofuels 
for transport do not materialise then the figure could be much higher for electricity (say 47%). 
21 Greater London Authority (2007). 
22 http://www.bwea.com/ukwed/planning.asp. Accessed 8th March 2008. 
23 http://www.berr.gov.uk/energy/sources/sustainable/carbon-abatement-tech/ccs-demo/page40961.html
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energy lightbulbs and smart metering clearly being targeted by government policy. 
However the significant behavioral change required will test public commitment to 
climate change policy. Zero carbon new homes will be a significant driver of change in 
terms proving of new technologies but the market for retrofitting existing homes with 
micro-generation sources or connection to district heating networks (which would 
significantly save on emissions from heating and electricity) has yet to established, but 
the theoretical potential is significant.24
 
The UK, like many other countries, has been through a period of significant uncertainty 
with respect to climate change policy. However there are now a number of significant 
commitments making progress into law. In particular a commitment to firm CO2 
reduction targets and carbon budgeting, to be overseen by the Office of Climate 
Change25. This is the context that will shape much of the investment that will go into the 
electricity sector in the years to 2020 and beyond. Much uncertainty about the detailed 
content of policy remains but the general direction seems clear. It is also clear that the 
climate change related component of prices for energy will have to rise significantly.26
 
Of course it is still possible that we will see a retreat from these policy commitments, but 
that seems increasingly unlikely, especially in the context of EU wide agreements. This is 
because the reality of actual climate change and its effects on both the UK and on other 
countries seems likely only to intensify political pressure for action in the domestic 
electricity sector. 
 
I think it is not going too far to suggest that the above three points constitute a strong case 
for saying that we need a substantial reexamination of the model of electricity regulation 
that has been so successful in the UK from 1991 to 2007. Climate change concern and its 
associated policy implications are so major that it would irresponsible not to ask whether 
our current regulatory model is fit for policy. This is because the current model existed in 
a world where the focus was on exploiting the efficiency gains that could be had from 
introducing competition, primarily facilitated by natural gas fired power stations in 
generation, and where independent regulators could deliver high values of X within price 
reviews from inefficient monopoly network owners via incentive regulation. Indeed 
Helm (2005) argues that the years since 1990 represent an unusual period of withdrawl of 
active political interest in the energy sector and that renewed political oversight and 
interference is now likely. Climate change will necessitate substantial institutional change 
in order to deliver a significant change in the carbon dioxide produced by the electricity 
sector. Of course it is not just regulation that is potentially at stake but also the ownership 
of electricity assets and the nature of how markets are organized in the electricity sector. 
 
3. Premises of a new regulatory model 
                                                 
24 A recent report (Wiltshire, 2006) established the theoretical potential for combined heat and power for 
commercial and residential buildings at 21.5 GWe at a 6% discount rate, dropping to less than 1 GW at a 
9% discount rate. 
25 www.occ.gov.uk 
26 In order to correctly reflect the damage of CO2, Hope and Newbery (2007) suggest high and rising prices 
per tonne of CO2, which would currently imply a price in excess of $40 per tonne or perhaps twice the 
current price in the EU ETS. This would perhaps raise electricity prices by another 10%. 
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In arguing that there is a case for reexamination of the traditional model of energy 
regulation (in electricity and, where similar, gas), we need some starting points before we 
discuss the elements of the new model. 
 
In this section I develop four premises on which any new regulatory system should be 
based. These are: first, that the lessons learned from the liberalization period should not 
be lost; second, that we need to focus on processes not just outcomes; third, that the 
economics of climate change should be a key driver; and fourth that managing 
uncertainty is the key to successful regulation. 
 
3.1 The Lessons of the Liberalisation period 
 
An examination of the key learnings from the period 1990-2007 suggests the following 
stylized facts about electricity markets (see Pollitt, 2008, for a fuller justification). First, 
competition reduces costs (and prices) significantly. It does this by encouraging efficient 
operation and least cost and timely investment. It also exposes pre-existing market power. 
Second, consumers do respond to price signals both by switching and by demand 
reduction. There also seems little reason why all consumers including residential 
consumers need centralized (and hence standardized) protection from wholesale market 
price fluctuations. Consumers have exhibited significant demand for fixed tariffs, which 
have emerged to allow those who wish to purchase insurance against price rises to do so. 
Third, markets do produce significant innovation. Thus we have seen significant retail 
innovation in terms of energy service management for large customers, innovative 
products for large and small customers (as noted above). We have also seen innovation in 
wholesale markets in terms of approaches to risk management and trading arrangements. 
Fourth, incentive regulation works and can be very powerful in driving down costs and 
improving standards. However incentive regulation should ensure that consumers benefit 
in a timely way from some of the improvements. Fifth, the vertical economies of joint 
operation between networks and competitive segments of the industry are not sufficient 
to outweigh the increased competitive pressure that comes from clear separation of the 
monopoly networks from the rest of the supply chain. This has been proved in electricity 
transmission, gas transmission and may be in process of being proved for gas distribution 
in the UK. Sixth, markets have proved adept at managing the short term risks associated 
with power markets, though there have been issues with the lack of liquidity in the 
market for long term contracts for power. The lack of liquidity in these markets may not 
be serious for residential consumers, who may not want long term contracts, but they are 
more significant for small supply companies who want to source power via long term 
contracts rather than make their own generation investments. Financial markets have also 
provided significant amounts of financing for power investments, much of it at low rates 
of interest. Finally, markets have been good at choosing between technologies on the 
basis of price, as for example demonstrated by the move to CCGT in the 1990s and the 
decline and renaissance of nuclear power investment in response to market prices. 
Although R+D expenditure has collapsed as a result of deregulation, a significant part of 
this reflected inefficiency in the expenditure before reform (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005b). 
Equally, it has proved possible to correct for any reduction in R+D budgets by 
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incentivising private R+D expenditure decisions via the introduction of decentralized 
innovation funding incentives (see Pollitt and Bialek, 2007). 
 
3.2 Focus on processes of regulation not just outcomes 
 
Currently independent regulators and those who review their performance are very 
focused on measures related to the outcomes of regulation. Historically, Ofgem has been 
much concerned about the degree of competition in the generation market as measured by 
the market shares of the leading generating companies, the degree of competition in the 
residential market as measured by the retail switching rate and loss of incumbent market 
share. In relation to regulation of networks Ofgem has been very concerned about the size 
of X, within the RPI-X formula, in its price control reviews, with higher values of X 
(subject to the condition that there are also high levels of investment) being associated 
with better outcomes for consumers, i.e. that lower regulated charges are better. 
 
Most of the above mentioned measures have no real meaning for an economic regulator, 
when looked at across time. On generation market shares, this can fluctuate but it is 
possible to have a very competitive market with higher concentration ratios than currently 
exhibited (in particular via integration of the UK national market within a bigger regional 
European market). It is not clear where Ofgem can go with this measure in the future. 
This is also true of its measures of retail market competition. Lower rates of switching 
may reflect more competitive offers by incumbents and less exploitation of incumbent 
customers. A clear parallel with telecoms exists here, where the incumbent in the UK, 
BT, the former incumbent monopolist, still has a significant share (of its traditional fixed 
line market) but is faced with an increasingly competitive market (see Ofcom, 2007). I 
am not saying that energy regulators are not aware of the measurement issues here, but 
that they have an issue in how they present useful metrics of performance. 
 
Ofgem has successfully achieved a competitive market in wholesale and retail power 
(though it is currently investigating the latter). This suggests that higher level monitoring 
and investigation can increasingly be left to the general competition authorities, who are 
able to apply sophisticated and proportionate regulation of competition, reflecting best 
practice across competition cases. There are two major advantages of general competition 
regulators over sector specific regulators. First, they are able to take a view on 
competition relative to other markets, particularly those that are not regulated. This 
ensures a degree of consistency in the approach to promoting competition, which trades 
off the costs and benefits of regulatory action. Second, where the problems are severe 
they can propose much tougher remedies including fines and structural reforms. Indeed 
arguably the GB electricity generation market and the GB gas supply industry only made 
significant progress following competition authority interventions, in spite of years of 
prior pressure from their sectoral regulators. Earlier referral to the competition authorities 
in both cases would have yielded benefits for consumers. Indeed an encouraging sign, in 
this vein, is that competition within the central European electricity market may be 
significantly facilitated by the activity of the European competition inquiry into the 
competitiveness of the energy sector (European Commission, 2007), initiated on the basis 
of EU competition law. 
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Instead climate change policies will pose new competitive challenges. Driven by rising 
prices for energy from gas and coal based technologies, incumbent network operators 
may face entry from private networks (which may want to connect up a few electricity 
and/or heat customers in a locality to a low carbon energy source) and requests to connect 
distributed generation. Thus ensuring that free entry and exit of new players and 
individuals, who wish to self-generate, should become an increasing focus of sector 
specific regulation (as this involves ongoing detailed assessment of connection rules and 
individual requests to connect/disconnect). These new entrants may wish to sign 
customers up to long term contracts for electricity, energy services and /or heat. Such 
contracts will need monitoring, at least initially, for unfair terms clauses and for mis-
selling. 
 
In the incentive regulation of networks, X will be driven by new investments. This means 
that independent regulators, like Ofgem, need to focus on the process by which it is 
decided that new investments are necessary. Reliance on an investment plan submitted by 
an incumbent network, audited by consultants, to determine both whether the investments 
are necessary and are least cost no longer seems appropriate, especially given the likely 
scale of the new investment. Indeed it may never have been appropriate, but may have 
been a reasonable shortcut when the investments being considered were less debatable 
and less significant. We look at this in more detail in section 4.1. 
 
Underlying all of the above, is the context that prices will be rising and hence judging 
Ofgem’s success on the basis of price will be increasingly difficult. Higher prices might 
well be justified if they deliver more CO2 reduction, more quickly. Thus a focus on both 
more sophisticated measures of the impact of regulation on social welfare and on the 
process by which regulatory decisions are arrived at seems appropriate. Indeed as some 
of the original studies of the impact of UK electricity market and regulatory reforms 
make clear the social welfare impact is not merely about price per se (see Newbery and 
Pollitt, 1997, and Domah and Pollitt, 2001). 
 
Beyond price, regulators will also need to decide on the quality of energy supply and 
local environmental impact that consumers are willing to pay for. This cannot be the 
decided as the outcome of a submission from the regulated companies. It will require an 
informed discussion between buyers and suppliers of network services and also be 
informed by the opinions of customers (expressed via willingness to pay surveys). One 
key element of this better informed process will be the system of penalties for over or 
under performance in the area of quality of service.  
 
3.3 The economics of climate change should be a key policy driver 
 
It seems clear that electricity sector will be the lead sector in the medium term response 
to CO2 emissions in the UK, closely followed by improvements in the use of heat. In 
2006, combustion for fuel for heat constituted 31% of CO2 emissions, just behind power 
station emissions which were 33% of the total. Focussing on fuel sources, in 2005 coal 
combustion accounted for 27% of CO2 emissions, while natural gas combustion was 
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36% of CO2 emissions.27  An economic regulator for energy, committed to economically 
efficient achievement of policy goals, potentially has a key role to play in this. Climate 
change policy should be all about ensuring the efficient internalization of the externality 
created by CO2 (and other greenhouse gases or GHGs) emissions. Clearly an economic 
regulator like Ofgem should consistently price CO2 across all of its regulatory 
interventions and do this consistently with other government policies. This has the 
potential to be a powerful institutional component of sensible policy trade-offs in 
government. A key problem will be the unwillingness, at least initially, for governments 
across Europe to simply let the price of CO2 rise to the level required to fully 
decentralize CO2 reductions. This makes sense at the level of the fact that the CO2 price 
in such a market would reflect all of the institutional barriers to low carbon investment – 
e.g. blockages in the planning process and uncertainties in the financial markets. Using a 
combination of prices and other policies would therefore seem sensible. However this 
suggests that large government inspired initiatives will be forthcoming e.g. trialing of 
smart metering and heat networks and subsidized investments in CCS and tidal barrages. 
Such initiatives are likely to be inconvenient in terms of necessitating adjustment of the 
rest of the electricity system to accommodate them. However Ofgem’s role should be to 
ensure that the competitions to enact government initiatives should be competitive and 
the costs of accommodating them should be minimized, i.e. the independent regulator 
should ensure that politically motivated investments in demonstration projects occur at 
least cost to the energy system. 
 
3.4 Managing uncertainty is the key to successful regulation of the sector 
 
The electricity sector is going to be faced with significant climate change inspired risks 
over the coming decade. These risks will primarily be around the exact course of national 
and international government policy towards climate change. Such risks must be faced. 
The role of the energy regulator should be to manage these risks as carefully as possible 
in order to minimize their impact on the cost and price of electricity. The primary way 
this will be done is via the weighted average cost of capital applied in price reviews or to 
specific regulator approved investments. Recent price reviews in GB have reflected an 
improving environment for infrastructure financing and a low degree of regulatory risk. 
In 2004 the electricity distribution price control assumed a 4.8% post tax rate of return 
(Ofgem, 2004); in 2006 the electricity and gas transmission price control review assumed 
a 4.4% post tax rate of return (Ofgem, 2006); in late 2007 the gas distribution price 
control review assumed a post tax rate of return of around 4.3% (Ofgem, 2007c). 
 
Some risks should be eliminated, others can be managed, some risks should be 
transferred to the private sector and others to the public sector. Thus revenue guarantees 
of the type embedded in price control reviews are a way of eliminating the revenue risk 
facing companies. An example of regulatory risk management would be allowing for the 
reopening of price reviews in the light of new information about government climate 
change policy requirements. An example of risk transfer to the private sector would be to 
deregulate parts of the value chain in response to market evolution (a recent example 
                                                 
27 See www.defra.gov.uk. For information transport CO2 emissions were 24% of the total is 2006, while 
petroleum was the source of 31% of emissions in 2005. 
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being the introduction of competition in metering in GB). An example of risk transfer to 
the government would be for the government to take responsibility for delivering certain 
targets (e.g. in the area of domestic energy efficiency measures). The precise allocation of 
risk would require some careful experimentation to test which risks are best allocated 
where. Efficient risk management would also require the evidence on the feasibility and 
cost of new technologies, which comes from large scale trials. It would also require a 
phased approach to achieving the targets being set by the Office of Climate Change that 
coordinates the timing of regulatory reviews, the announcement of policy initiatives and 
dates for the achievement of targets. 
 
This is important as it will reduce the capital cost, by avoiding unnecessary investments, 
and reduce the required rate of return, both of which will together drive the cost of 
climate change concern policy.  
 
A key example of this would be in the financing of existing networks. It is possible to 
simultaneously guarantee the revenue stream of existing investments and encourage 
competition in the area of new investments. Thus one might want to be very careful to 
reassure existing network owners that their sunk investments are protected while working 
to create competition between distributed generation, demand reduction investments and 
new network investment. 
 
4. The elements of a new model of economic regulation 
 
In the light of the above drivers of change and the premises for a new regulatory model, I 
explore what the key elements of a new model of economic regulation might consist of. 
In doing so I draw on the latest research on regulatory experiences and on the challenges 
posed by climate change concern. I will discuss three elements of the new model in turn: 
new processes of regulation; new models of competition and the issues raised by a focus 
on climate change. 
 
4.1 New regulatory processes 
 
In section 3.2 I suggested that economic regulation needed to focus on processes rather 
than outcomes. This was because old measures of the outcome of regulation now have 
little meaning and that what matters is the way that investment requirements are decided 
and incentivised. A key way to do this is shift responsibility for deciding on network 
investment requirements on to the buyers and sellers of network services. The central 
idea is that decisions on investments in capacity and quality should be negotiated 
between the parties in the industry. The regulator would still be formally responsible for 
approving any network investment plan within the context of regulatory price control 
review – assuming that they had not be deemed to be excluded from monopoly 
regulation. The regulator would move from being the key decision maker to being the 
auditor of decisions agreed between the buyers and sellers. The regulator might continue 
to provide independent assessment of the scope for efficiency improvement or the social 
value of particular investments. This is a variant of a ‘negotiated settlements’ approach 
practiced in North America (Doucet and Littlechild, 2006) or of the ‘constructive 
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engagement’ approach introduced by the Civil Aviation Authority for the regulation of 
airports in the UK (CAA, 2005). 
 
Negotiated settlements have several theoretical (and practical) advantages. First, they 
shift much of the risk for getting decisions wrong on to the companies or consumer 
representatives involved in the negotiations. This is especially true when buyers of 
network services have to say how much quantity and quality they are prepared to pay for. 
Clearly getting this wrong may impact negatively or positively on their profitability of 
the companies, yet it is also true they should be in the best position to predict future 
demand requirements. Second, they will tend to better allocate risk between the 
consumers and the regulated companies relative to a regulator imposed solution. This is 
because if the regulator has to predict what the investment requirements are, they will 
tend to be conservative and be likely to leave the consumer with costs of overinvestment 
or underinvestment, socialized within network tariffs. Third, negotiated settlements will 
produce innovations in regulatory processes as the transaction costs of regulation are 
determined by the parties to the negotiation. Companies will seek to reduce these costs by 
suggesting how negotiated outcomes might be arrived at, at less cost. Fourth, negotiated 
settlements will be better at making more informed trade-offs between quality and cost as 
these will be jointly negotiated by the companies rather than, as they usually are, treated 
separately by the regulator. Finally, negotiated settlements are likely to produce more 
innovative regulatory outcomes as private companies are good at drawing up contracts 
between them which efficiently allocate risk and reward. 
 
Evidence on the operation of such approaches is growing. Stephen Littlechild has 
published a series of papers looking at their operation in North and South America. His 
examples are interesting because the arrangements examined have been introduced in 
parallel with market liberalization. 
 
It seems clear that for transmission investments (and gas distribution) it is reasonably 
easy to envisage ways in which such an approach would work. Ownership unbundling (in 
England and Wales at least)28 of electricity and gas networks ensures that the seller – 
National Grid – faces an array of significant buyers – the generators and gas suppliers. 
 
Doucet and Littlechild (2006) show how negotiated settlements were introduced to 
determine the price of oil and gas pipeline services in Canada. An important advance was 
the setting of a regulatory weighted average cost of capital (WACC) each year, which 
could be used in the negotiations, thus eliminating a potential source of disagreement 
between the buyers and sellers. Littlechild and Skerk (2007) detail the important 
Argentine experience with voting rules for deciding whether new electricity transmission 
investments were to be undertaken. The UK would seem well suited to moving towards a 
negotiated settlements approach in electricity and gas transmission given the existing 
ownership structure. 
 
                                                 
28 Scottish electricity transmission network ownership, though not system operation, remains part of 
integrated companies. 
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A key question is the extent to which negotiations could be used to determine electricity 
distribution investments. Here integration between the distribution network owners and 
generators and suppliers is potentially a problem. There might also be issues to do with 
coordination across negotiations as the same parties negotiate the investment plan for 
each network area. However the prospects for progress seem encouraging. Littlechild and 
Ponzano (2007) discuss the development of a ‘sub-transmission’ (high voltage 
distribution – mainly 132 KV, but also some 66 KV)29 plan in Buenos Aires Province 
(the area around Buenos Aires) involving negotiations between 200+ buyers and the local 
sub-transmission company. They find that negotiations did result in the agreement of a 
ten-year plan for a range of sizes of investment. The process did not involve large 
transaction costs (as many of the smaller players let larger parties with aligned interests 
negotiate on their behalf). 
 
Littlechild (2007) also reports on the role of the consumer advocate in Florida who with 
small annual budget successfully negotiated significant packages of price reductions for 
utility customers using his public profile and the threat of referral to the Public Utilities 
Commission for price review in the absence of agreement. This consumer advocate could 
have an important role in European countries, such as the UK, in the area of proposing 
social tariffs, offered by energy retailers to poor consumers. A powerful and informed 
consumer voice is likely to be more important as electricity and gas prices rise. 
 
Closer to home, Ofgem has recently had very positive experience with setting gas 
distribution prices (where gas networks are unbundled), with active contributions from 
the largest gas supplier who provided constructive input into the regulation with the aim 
of keeping the gas distribution charged to its customers down. 
 
It is worth discussing some of what has happened during the constructive engagement 
process used by the regulator, the CAA, at Heathrow and Gatwick airports (see Bush, 
2007 and CAA, 2008a, b). This has recently ended. However there has been substantial 
agreement between the airlines and the airport owners.30 In particular there has been 
agreement about the incentive scheme to be placed on the airport owner, BAA, for the 
delivery of new investment and the automatic traffic growth triggers for new investment. 
There has also been agreement on levels of service to be provided by the airports and the 
penalties and risk sharing for non-delivery. The CAA reports that the process has been 
slow to get going and that airlines have been critical of it – perhaps because it was a new 
form of regulation. However it has built substantially on the existing Airport Consultative 
Committees, which existed at each airport prior to the current price control review. This 
suggests that negotiated settlements can work in the UK and can build on existing 
informal processes of consultation between buyers and sellers of network services. 
Indeed one could go further and suggest that the fact that the process has been useful in 
an industry with an incumbent monopolist with a very poor reputation and a group of 
                                                 
29 In the UK both of these voltages are operated by distribution network companies. 
30 CAA (2008b, p.v): ‘The CAA considers that, as a result of such engagement, its price control decisions 
are significantly better informed by a broader and deeper understanding of airlines’ views, along with 
BAA’s own responses to its users’ requirements.’ 
 
 22
very diverse (in terms of size and quality preferences) purchasers in the airlines suggests 
much more scope for the success of constructive engagement in electricity and gas.31  
 
4.2 New Models of Competition 
 
As Box 1 highlights, promoting effective competition is central to the acheivement of 
Ofgem’s mandate. I believe that in the context of electricity and gas markets this has to 
interpreted more widely in the future, beyond whether there is significant competition 
between existing large energy suppliers. As we noted in 3.1 competition has had 
important successes in the era of deregulation of electricity markets. However as we 
pointed out in 3.2 the current measures of competition seem less relevant in the coming 
era than they did in the past. 
 
As we have already suggested, in section 3.2, that where competition has matured 
responsibility for monitoring how competitive the overall market is should be shifted to 
the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission. 
 
Ofgem needs to focus on how vulnerable customers are being treated within the 
competitive market. These are the consumers about whom it should be concerned. Richer 
consumers in competitive markets who choose not to switch should not be the primary 
concern of independent regulators. 
 
The discussion of negotiated settlements in section 4.1 highlighted their benefit in 
choosing which investments were necessary. However clear lessons also exist from 
Argentina on the key role of competition in the tendering process for investments, 
decided by negotiation, in network services. Argentina had an excellent experience with 
this in electricity transmission, with active bidding for contracts (Littlechild and Skerk, 
2007). The tender price was then used as the basis of the charges to be paid for the 
investment (akin to including it in the rate base). In an age when investment is set to 
increase sharply, competition in the tendering process for new investments, and the 
passing of any benefits from the tendering process on to consumers will be a big issue. 
There is much more scope for encouraging competition in the tendering market and then 
using these prices within price control reviews. Argentina engaged in competitive 
tendering in sub-transmission on investment blocks down to $2m (Littlechild and 
Ponzano, 2007). 
 
Ofgem should also examine the barriers to new entry into generation, energy services and 
heat networks. Competition between grid supplied electricity, microgeneration and heat 
networks is something that may emerge in the future (Patterson, 2007) and be an 
important disciplining force on incumbent companies. A clear comparison exists here 
with fixed line telecoms where new technology has emerged to create new networks and 
also to install parallel lines. 
 
                                                 
31 BAA and its role in the market for airport services has been the subject of a Competition Commission 
investigation since March 2007. 
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Such a radical view of the possible evolution of competition suggests that serious 
consideration be given to the ownership unbundling of electricity distribution networks 
from generation and retail, as this may be a key way to facilitate the entry of energy 
service companies and heat networks, as well as facilitating negotiated settlements. This 
again would parallel developments in telecoms where BT has recently formally separated 
its retail and lines business, as part of an agreement with the regulator Ofcom, via the 
creation of a lines business, Openreach.32  
 
4.3 The issues raised by a focus on climate change 
 
A focus on the issue of climate change by the energy regulator has a number of important 
implications for the way economic regulation of energy is conducted. While all these 
issues we go on to discuss are important, some of them could be addressed by agencies 
outside of the economic regulator, however my observation is that they are not receiving 
sufficient focus within economic regulation at the moment due to a lack of mandate or 
powers in this area. 
 
My starting point is as in 3.3: from the perspective of an economic regulator climate 
change policy is all about ensuring the efficient internalization of the externality created 
by CO2 emissions. It should not be confused with energy security concerns or industrial 
policy objectives for domestic technologies. My view is that independent regulatory 
agencies such as Ofgem can play a key role in focusing regulatory incentives on the 
effective internalization of environmental externalities.  
 
Several new directions for regulation suggest themselves in the light of this and the areas 
of work for the energy regulator that suggest themselves. Each of these areas is currently 
a small work area within an independent regulatory agency, such as Ofgem. However 
each has the potential to become extremely significant. 
 
4.3.1 Effective internalization of externalities 
 
There is a need for serious independent investigation of whether major low carbon 
investments in electricity and heat are worthwhile given that international schemes (such 
as EU ETS) may not provide sufficient incentives to meet national objectives. In Europe 
the key issue is the extent to which the EU ETS will deliver. The EU ETS raises an 
important discount rate issue, which we highlight below. 
 
Table 2 shows that the choice of the two low carbon investments varies according to the 
discount rate chosen. Both investments take 2 years to make and pay off equally over 8 
years. However Investment 1 involves higher up front construction costs but lower 
running costs relative to Investment 2. 
 
                                                 
32 See http://www.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/btundertakings/otherdocs/overview.pdf 
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Table 2: The choice between two investments with identical energy and emissions 
reduction benefits. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario:Two alternative investments; Carbon Reduction of Two Investments Identical
Context Decentralised project
Costs
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
Investment 1 500 500
Investment 2 245 245 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
NPV 1, 10% £867.77
NPV 2, 10% £866.11
NPV 1, 2% £970.78
NPV 2, 2% £1,179.78
Benefits
0 0 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197
NPV, 10% £868.58
0 0 138 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
NPV, 2% £971.66
Extra Investment Cost of 10% discount rate:  £209.00 22%
Extra carbon price cost of 10% discount rate: £415.42 43%
 
At a 10% discount rate Investment 2 has a lower net present value and should be chosen. 
However at a 2% discount rate the net present value of Investment 1 is substantially less 
than Investment 2. Weitzman (2008) argues that we should use 2% social discount rates 
or less for climate change investments given the catastrophe risk associated with CO2 
emissions. However if we actually use a market rate of 10%, the choice of investment 
will be changed between two investments with equal climate change mitigation effect. 
The cost of this investment is 22% higher when discounted at the 2% social discount rate. 
If we leave it to the EU ETS to provide the incentive for the low carbon investment, the 
effect of discount rates is quite striking. In the table the Benefits streams indicate the 
annual payoffs required to generate a net present value equivalent to the discounted costs 
at the two discount rates. If all private investors in low carbon investments require a 10% 
return as opposed to a 2% return, the price in the EU ETS of CO2 will be 43% higher. 
Given that this will translate into higher energy prices this raises important questions 
about the discount rate to be used in climate change investments and its implications.  
 
It is highly likely that the government will and should examine a number of investments 
which make sense on the basis of social discount rates in climate change risk reduction 
but which are very challenging to fit these into the existing electricity market. One can 
think of nuclear power, the Severn barrage and large scale domestic heat networks as 
possibilities. An economic regulator should be in the business of evaluating these 
schemes and suggesting how to ensure they are built at least cost and how any required 
financial support is best raised from electricity consumers. 
 
4.3.2 Demand is as important as supply 
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There is a need to focus on demand management as being as important as sources of 
generation (especially in the first instance). The European Union has ambitious targets on 
energy efficiency (a 20% reduction in energy usage by 2020). Low hanging fruit exists in 
the area of demand side management. Some of this can be identified in the UK: low 
energy light bulbs might cut total demand by 2-3%; LED street-lighting by 0.7% of total 
demand. Other measures such as staying on British Summer Time all year may be 
worthwhile. There is also the issue of raising electricity prices (in Denmark the tax on 
domestic electricity use is 100%) to support demand reduction investments. If the 
demand side invests to save CO2 how can it share some of the benefits if they are not 
fully reflected in the price of electricity? More work needs to be done on the potential for 
smart metering to reduce demand and/or to shift it in order to increase economic 
efficiency in the power sector. In the US regulatory agencies often oversee substantial 
demand side management programmes (e.g. in California) aimed at overcoming the 
market failures which exist in this part of the market. These incentivise electricity 
companies to achieve demand reductions via allowing them to finance demand reducing 
investments in their regulated charges. 
 
4.3.3 Support new entrants 
 
New entrants into low carbon production and energy management need to be encouraged 
and concerns about the inaction of incumbents in providing network access or 
import/export services addressed. We need to recognize the possibility that existing 
incumbents may not be best placed to deliver the de-carbonisation of the electricity 
sector. There are a number of reasons for this: they require legitimacy in spending the 
large amounts of capital investment that will be required; more locally based companies 
may be more effective an engaging the public in demand reduction or the uptake of 
micro-generation; new business models may be more appropriate, such as those focused 
on energy service management, rather than ownership of hard assets. 
 
It should also be pointed out that the public sector has traditionally been important in the 
rapid roll out of intrusive networks with initially poor returns (even when run efficiently). 
While few would advocate a return to public ownership of energy networks (where these 
have been privatised), history does suggest interesting reasons for increased government 
ownership in the electricity and gas sectors e.g. to do with cost of private financing and 
the political sensitivity of siting assets (see Foreman-Peck, 2003 and Gleaser, 2001).  
Public operation of the underlying assets is no longer necessary as the financing 
advantages of public ownership can be achieved via a public-private partnership. If the 
historical reasons for public ownership are mirrored today then it is quite possible 
therefore that we will see significant public-private partnerships emerge in the electricity 
sector in the coming years. Indeed it is highly unlikely that any subsidized roll out of a 
new technology, such as heat networks would not have public sector involvement. Such 
facilities based competition might involve competition from water companies. Private 
energy services companies based around smart control of heating and lighting and joint 
provision of security or IT services might also have a role to play in the future. 
Independent regulators, such as Ofgem, should have a key role in facilitating the entry of 
new players into the market, especially where these have strong political backing. 
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4.3.4 Engage with local initiatives 
 
There is a need to engage with local initiatives as these are start up projects that need 
regulatory assistance and have the potential to be important market drivers in the future. 
This relates to the previous point about encouraging new entrants. The regulatory agency 
needs to have the capacity to support local initiatives to get off the ground. These are 
potentially very significant in terms of climate change mitigation, but also in terms of 
supporting the legitimacy of political support for the whole of climate change policy. 
Local initiatives have the capacity to be popular and to engage individuals in 
environmentally friendly action at low cost, by for instance being effective ways of 
targeting subsidy.  
 
In the UK, some small examples of local initiatives currently exist: some community 
enterprises in Scotland and local authority heat schemes in places such as Woking (see 
London Energy Partnership, 2007). However the capacity exists for significant take off in 
this area, with the London Energy Savings Partnership in place to help deliver London’s 
ambitious target for reducing CO2 by setting up local energy service companies. London 
Energy Partnership (2007) identifies 7 current schemes, with more in planning. 
 
4.3.5 Plan for large-scale trials 
 
There needs to be planning for large scale trials of new technologies in electricity 
production and demand management. Most current local initiatives are small, too small to 
make a real difference to the UK’s overall CO2 targets. However they are important 
examples of social entrepreneurship and give rise to demonstration effects. What is clear 
is that we will need much larger scale trials to demonstrate the least cost way of reducing 
CO2 emissions, given that divergence of approaches is, at least initially, desirable.  These 
trials will need to take place at the level of medium sized cities and might involve, for 
example, the setting up a heat network, smart metering in every home and/or the 
establishment of a well funded local energy service company (ESCO). Several 
requirements to begin moving in this direction are set out EU Directive (06/32) on 
Energy End-Use Efficiency and Energy Services and supported by the UK government’s 
response (DEFRA, 2007). 
 
Some of these trials, and their associated technologies, would require the development of 
regulations for heat networks and ESCOs. These are currently not subject to specific 
regulation in the UK. They would also require powers to deal with the incumbent local 
monopolies, such that the value of their property rights is protected, but their ability to 
block the successful implementation of trials is removed.  
 
5 Conclusions 
 
I have argued that the future of electricity (and related gas) regulation involves new 
processes for doing economic regulation, a wider interpretation of the requirement to 
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promote competition and a clear shift of emphasis to the effective internalization of the 
environmental externality of greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
This is not to say that independent regulators, such as Ofgem, have not been extremely 
effective in delivering their mandates to date. It is to say that that mandates (and their 
interpretation and power to deliver them) born of an era of electricity (and gas) 
deregulation following inefficient state intervention in the operation of the industry and 
prior to the era of climate change concern need to be reconsidered and, as necessary, 
challenged. It is therefore encouraging that Ofgem has recently recognized this by 
announcing a major review of its system of RPI-X price control. This ‘RPI at 20’ review 
explicitly asks whether a system that has worked well for 20 years is fit for purpose going 
forward (Buchanan, 2008). 
 
In the specific context of the UK I offer a couple of concluding sets of observations for 
national government and energy companies. 
 
While much can be done within Ofgem’s existing mandate, it does seem to be the case 
that Ofgem’s mandate and hence its powers do need some clarification (see also 
Sustainable Development Commission, 2007). I have argued that the current primary 
focus on the promotion of competition is no longer appropriate for a specialist energy 
regulator like Ofgem. This is not to say that competition is no longer important. It is to 
say that other issues require relatively more attention and that a significant part of the 
current competition agenda can be handled by the general competition authorities. I think 
that something like the promotion of economic efficiency in the delivery of energy 
services, better captures all of the trade-offs between supply and demand, production 
costs and price, and environmental and financial costs that need to be covered by Ofgem. 
The UK government needs to clarify CO2 targets for the electricity (and heat) sector in 
particular and there may be a role for government in some of the public-private 
partnerships that would be seem to be necessary to deliver some socially valuable CO2 
reducing investments. Helm (2005) and Maugis and Nuttall (2008) go further and argue 
for the need a new UK energy policy – which would also include to nuclear policy and 
primary energy supply security - based around concentrating the existing, dispersed, civil 
service and ministerial effort either in a single agency (Helm) or under a single minister 
(Maugis and Nuttall). 
 
For companies there are two pieces of good news. First, fair rates of return can be 
guaranteed on existing investments and low risk investors can focus on established 
network investments. At worst, policy towards climate change will give rise to the need 
to allow for stranded asset recovery (as was the case with electricity deregulation in the 
presence of private monopolies). Second, investment requirements are rising. Yago et al. 
(2008) estimate that environmentally inspired investments will add £28bn of investment 
to 2020 in the GB electricity sector above the base case. This implies opportunities for 
incumbents and entrants alike in the presence of a level playing field. 
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